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Designing for Cost Transparency in Investment Advisory Service Encounters 
Philipp Nussbaumer, Inu Sarah Matter, Gian Reto á Porta, Gerhard Schwabe 
University of Zurich 
Short teaser 
Clients of investment advisory services are generally dissatisfied because of the services’ lack 
of transparency. In general, advisors do not provide clients with transparent and detailed 
information on costs – such information, however, is of much importance, since an 
investment portfolio’s costs directly influence its effective return. In this paper, we present a 
design science research cycle on how cost transparency may be provided in client-advisor 
encounters as a feature of collaborative tabletop artifacts. We find that our cost transparent 
design positively influences the client’s perception of the service encounter as well as its 
results. Not only are clients more satisfied but also do they declare increased willingness to 
pay for the cost-transparent service. 
Abstract  
Investment advisory services of financial service providers (FSPs) exhibit several 
characteristics that are detrimental to advisory quality. The interaction of advisor and client is 
strained by a lack of transparency regarding the advisory process (what activities are 
performed and why) and the information used therein (what information is used for what 
purpose and with what effect), as well as regarding the precise costs of the service and the 
recommended products. In prior research, we suggested that process and information 
transparency issues may be appropriately addressed with collaborative information 
technology (IT) artifacts. In this paper, we argue that collaborative, transparent artifacts may 
also be a premise of enabling cost transparency. To this end, we describe a complete research 
cycle of designing, implementing and evaluating a shared cost-transparent IT artifact to 
support client-advisor interaction in investment advisory encounters. Evaluation results 
suggest the efficacy of our design in improving the clients’ perceived cost transparency as 
well as increase their satisfaction and their willingness to pay for the received investment 
advice. These findings may also challenge the common belief of FSPs that transparent, fee-
based advisory services would neither be accepted by clients nor be economically viable. 
Practical implications of these findings for designing advisory encounters with supportive IT 
are discussed. 
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1  Introduction 
Investors are dissatisfied with their financial service providers’ (FSPs) investment advisory 
services (Mogicato et al. 2009). Indeed, to counteract cost pressures resulting from fierce 
competition, FSPs have been optimizing their advisory activities towards product sale rather 
than provision of advice, leading to a poor quality of advice (Jungermann and Belting 2004). 
For investment advisory services, research suggests several characteristics that are detrimental 
to advisory quality, including information asymmetry and interest asymmetry (Oehler and 
Kohlert 2009). Due to these asymmetries, the advisor might exploit the client’s less 
knowledge and experience to opportunistically pursue his own goals (e.g., by only 
superficially gathering information or deliberately presenting information in an 
incomprehensible way). Such (possible) behavior is fostered by the lack of information 
disclosure, especially regarding the exact costs of the investment advisory service and the 
products offered therein – thus, the client cannot be sure whether the advisor is optimizing the 
solution for the client’s best interest or, on the contrary, towards higher fees and provisions. 
Considering the clients’ general preference and demand for transparency (Lechner et al. 
2009), the revenue models of FSPs lead to a paradoxical situation; while FSPs are trying to 
confront competition by designing cost structures to be highly non-transparent and thereby 
difficult to compare (Carlin 2009), they are at the same time impairing the resulting service 
quality as perceived by their clients – potentially also affecting their satisfaction. Indeed, 
looking at the prevailing business models of Swiss FSPs and the resulting incentive systems 
of advisors, we argue that the lack of cost transparency may be a major source of client 
dissatisfaction. 
As legislative regulations trying to establish transparency “top down” do not hold up to their 
promises (Oehler and Kohlert 2009), in this paper we suggest a “bottom up” approach of 
introducing transparency at the locus of investment advisory services – the client-advisor 
encounter. We start our investigations by posing the question of why FSPs are still refraining 
from establishing cost transparency. Based on a comprehensive study of the status quo of 
investment advisory services in Swiss FSPs (Mogicato et al. 2009), we find two major 
reasons: 
(1) Given that information technology (IT) is hardly used in advisory encounters (Schwabe 
and Nussbaumer 2009), cost transparency of advisory results (i.e., product portfolios 
configured by the advisor and adapted to the client’s preferences) is very difficult to 
maintain – while it is complex enough to allow for ad-hoc changes of product allocation 
(e.g., replacing one product with another), it is virtually impossible to adapt and configure 
such portfolios while dynamically adjusting or accounting for changes in the cost structure 
– the calculation of actual costs in such scenarios is likely to be too complex. Thereby, the 
client is confronted with the actual costs of her decisions typically only after they have 
been made. 
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(2) FSPs consider cost transparency being detrimental their business models, supposing – and 
thereby following neoclassical theory’s intuition – that clients would always opt for the 
least expensive product from a set of (perfect) substitutes (including products of 
competitors). The majority of FSPs find such client behavior problematic, as they – in 
order to provide their advisory services “free-of-charge” – cross-subsidize them with 
earnings from selling products, which in turn involve a multitude of subsidiary costs, such 
as management fees, transaction fees, etc. This constellation, however, exposes the client 
to serious conflicts of interests – will the advisor optimize the client’s portfolio according 
to her needs and preferences or rather to achieve cost coverage? 
In previous research, we have suggested that transparency issues in investment advisory 
encounters may be best addressed with shared IT artifacts (Nussbaumer and Schwabe 2010). 
Providing shared information spaces, such artifacts may increase the client’s perceived 
transparency in respect of the advisory process as well as the information used therein 
(Nussbaumer et al. 2012).  
In this paper, we present a complete build-and-evaluate design cycle (Hevner et al. 2004), in 
which we demonstrate that such shared artifacts may also bridge the complexity of enabling 
cost transparency, i.e., provide access to dynamic cost information. Such procedure is also 
interesting from a transparency research perspective. While much literature is concerned with 
the theoretical benefits and effects of transparency, empirical investigations are rare, 
especially in terms of design research. We aim to contribute to this body of knowledge in two 
ways; first, we provide insights into the feasibility of incorporating facets of cost transparency 
into the design of shared IT artifacts; second, in an experimental evaluation we demonstrate 
the efficacy of such artifacts in improving cost transparency and investigate their practical 
impacts on client-advisor encounters. Based on the literature, we thereby argue that 
introducing cost-transparent artifacts may – in contrast to the FSPs’ beliefs – not only have 
positive influence on the client’s satisfaction with the encounter but also on her willingness to 
pay. 
We based the build activities of our design science endeavor on design principles of 
establishing process and information transparency in investment advisory encounters 
(Nussbaumer and Matter 2011; Nussbaumer et al. 2012). Conceptualizing cost transparency 
as a facet of information transparency, we extended these design principles by features of cost 
information provision and instantiated them in a shared IT artifact to mediate client-advisor 
interaction. 
The resulting IT artifact was evaluated against its design goal of improving cost transparency 
as well as its proposed effects of increasing client satisfaction and willingness to pay. In order 
to delimit the efficacy of cost transparency from principles of establishing process and 
information transparency, we conducted controlled experiments involving two different 
artifacts; one implemented the general principles of process and information transparency, the 
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other extended these principles by features of cost transparency. Using a within-subject 
design with 12 clients and 2 advisors, the experiment let client participants pass through two 
advisory settings supported with the respective artifacts. According to the experimental 
design, differences in client valuation between the settings could be ascribed to the 
differences of the IT artifacts, which were only related to cost transparency. 
Results demonstrate the cost transparency design’s efficacy in improving the client’s 
perceived understanding and comprehension of costs; they also indicate a positive influence 
of the cost transparency features on the client’s general assessment of the advisory encounter. 
On the one hand, clients show increased satisfaction with the cost-transparent encounter. On 
the other hand, and supporting Carter and Curry’s (2010) notion of an individual’s economic 
and social perspective on product pricing, in such encounters clients indeed tend to prefer less 
expensive products (economic perspective) but in turn exhibit increased willingness to pay for 
the service received (social perspective). These findings may challenge the common belief of 
FSPs that transparent, fee-based advisory services would neither be accepted by clients nor be 
economically viable. 
2  Transparency in Investment Advisory Encounters 
In this paper, we investigate cost transparency in Swiss investment advisory services with a 
focus on affluent private clients (with an approximate investment amount of 50’000 to 
500’000 CHF). We chose to investigate this segment as it marks the bottom end of the private 
banking market and is, given its potential growth, increasingly considered a lucrative market 
by FSPs (Molyneux and Omarini 2005). Also, most Swiss FSPs have established structured 
advisory processes to target this growing segment with consistent and efficient services. 
These services provide assistance in defining strategic asset allocations according to the 
client’s needs and risk preference as well as their tactical implementation with financial 
products. We base our practical insights on investigations of 37 Swiss financial service 
providers (Mogicato et al. 2009) as well as in-depth interviews and observations in a major 
Swiss bank. 
2.1 Transparency Issues 
In investment advisory service encounters, client-advisor interactions exhibit several 
characteristics that are detrimental to advisory quality. Most prominently, the encounter is 
inherently impacted by information asymmetry and interest asymmetry, problems that are 
well established in scientific literature in context of the principal-agent problem (Golec 1992). 
Information asymmetry results from the client being generally less knowledgeable than the 
advisor – thus, she cannot be sure whether the advisor actually gathers and provides all 
relevant information and recommends appropriate solutions for her financial needs. The 
relation between client and advisor can be additionally strained by conflicts of interests. 
Advisors might exploit information asymmetry by, e.g., superficially gathering and providing 
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information or, even worse, recommending products that are unsuitable for the specific 
client’s needs but profitable in terms of fees.  
From the client’s perspective, these issues may be characterized by the implied lack of 
transparency. For investment advisory service encounters, we may differentiate between 
process transparency, information transparency and cost transparency. Process transparency 
relates to “the degree of the client being able to follow and comprehend the performed 
activities (what constitutes an activity and why is it performed) and their succession in 
advisory [services]” (Nussbaumer and Matter 2011, p. 280). While this entails the 
comprehensibility of the advisory process, information transparency involves two aspects; (1) 
the clients’ comprehension of which information are recorded and for what purpose (Awad 
and Krishnan 2006), as well as (2) the degree of the client being enabled to monitor and 
comprehend the informational basis of decision-making (Nussbaumer et al. 2012). 
Regarding the recommendation of products (the ultimate goal of investment advisory 
services), we argue that cost transparency is particularly relevant. When buying or selling 
financial products, the transaction costs as well as the costs associated to a specific product 
(including direct costs such as initial buy charges, sell charges, stamp duties and management 
fees as well as indirect costs like retrocessions or finder’s fees) play a vital role as they 
directly influence the portfolio’s effective return. Providing the client with exact product costs 
rather than only with their exchange rates should thus allow for a more realistic assessment of 
product choices and their effects, thereby better enabling the clients to evaluate the advisor’s 
recommendations. 
In this paper, we conceptualize cost transparency as a facet of the discussed second aspect of 
information transparency, related to the client being enabled to monitor and comprehend the 
information base of the advisory encounter. This concept is closely related to price 
transparency, which is concerned with “information revealing the allocation among agents in 
a supply-chain of proceeds from the sale of a product or service” (Carter and Curry 2010, p. 
760). Also acknowledging the transparency definition of Kraft (2008), we therefore may 
define cost transparency as the client’s perceived degree of information revelation regarding 
costs and their allocation.  
In investment advisory encounters, the degree of information revelation is typically low or 
inappropriate (Oehler and Kohlert 2009); precise costs and prices are either not available in 
the encounter or not disclosed (e.g., because of interest conflicts), or may be represented in an 
overly complex manner (inherent to the complex cost structures, e.g., Carlin (2009)). Thus, to 
establish cost information transparency, cost information (1) has to be made available in the 
advisory encounter and (2) be comprehensibly represented and included in decision-making.  
2.2  Effects of Transparency 
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Looking at the diversity of research domains that are concerned with transparency, we find a 
rich body of literature on theoretical benefits and effects of transparency. Empirical 
investigations, however, are rare, especially regarding advisory settings. For IS research, we 
are not aware of theoretical, empirical or design-related accounts regarding cost transparency 
in investment advisory services or client-advisor encounters in general.  
For their concepts of increasing the customer’s involvement in service encounters, Inbar and 
Tractinsky (2011) propose that transparency may be increased by sharing information with 
IT. They suggest that establishing transparency thereby may positively influence the client’s 
perception of the service encounter and provider (e.g., regarding fairness and integrity, trust 
and satisfaction). In their empirical investigation of buyer-vendor relationships, Eggert and 
Helm (2003) as well conclude that transparency contributes to the overall success of a 
business relationship, delivers value to the customer and increases satisfaction.  
Other practical implications may be drawn from the research of Andersson and Holm (1998). 
They argue that decision makers who are guided by “Popperian epistemology” will have a 
preference for transparency – only if information is provided transparently, the individual will 
be able to potentially “falsify” them (analogous to Popper's notion of falsifiability of scientific 
theories). Andersson and Holm (1998) associate such preferences with an individual’s 
suspicion in situations where transparency is not warranted, and hypothesize that individuals 
are more inclined to suspect manipulation when falsification of the information at hand is 
more difficult. 
In the behavioral finance literature, such preference for transparency has been prominently 
discussed as investors’ “ambiguity aversion” (Camerer and Weber 1992). Research suggests 
that individuals appreciate “ambiguous” situations (having no information about the 
probability distribution) less than “risky” situations (the probability distribution of the event is 
known), and are normally willing to pay to avoid ambiguity (Stracca 2004, p. 382). Carter and 
Curry (2010) find similar evidence in their research on transparent pricing, showing that 
individuals prefer products with transparent prices (providing allocation of costs to different 
supply-side parties) over their non-transparent counterparts and are willing to pay premium 
prices for such products. 
2.3  Cost Transparency 
In Switzerland, regulations on cost disclosure differ depending on the relation of client and 
FSP, i.e., whether the client maintains accounts and portfolios without making use of advisory 
services (“execution only”), taking advice but making her own decisions (“investment 
advice”) or completely transfers decision-making to the provider (“asset management 
mandate”) (Roth 2009). While in all cases FSPs have to fulfill basic duties of allegiance, due 
diligence and information disclosure, they are obliged to provide detailed cost information 
(including financial recompensation) only for mandates (FINMA 2008). 
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For European financial markets, the European Commission (2004) passed the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) to establish uniform regulations with an emphasis on 
consumer protection. Generally focusing on principles of “best execution”, the directive also 
demands providing all relevant cost information (European Commission 2004, Art. 19, par. 3; 
Roth 2007, p. 39). Oehler and Kohlert (2009, p. 98) argue, however, that such regulatory 
requirements are too generic and thereby must fail, as they are neither comprehensive nor 
specific enough and make unrealistic assumptions regarding the client’s prior knowledge and 
ability to comprehend the provided information. 
The clients’ preference for transparency and legislature’s efforts to create adequate 
regulations on transparency, however, seems not to be mirrored in FSP’s practice of 
investment advisory services (Mogicato et al. 2009). To the contrary, Carlin (2009) shows 
that complexity of financial products tends to increase with competition – it is, in fact, a 
strategy of market participants to achieve higher profits. As most clients are not aware of a 
product’s associated costs and their influence on the portfolio’s return or not be able to 
(dynamically) estimate them, enabling transparency is timely – Finra (2009) finds this might 
be a quite general issue, reporting that the majority of private investors (in the US) have 
problems with assessing costs and prices of financial products. Thus, the responsibility for 
such considerations lies with the advisor, who may (or may not) exploit the information 
asymmetry for his or the FSP’s self-interest.  
In a comprehensive study of advisory practice in Swiss banks (Mogicato et al. 2009), we 
found that clients are quite aware of the discussed transparency issues; the prevailing lack of 
such transparency results in clients considering financial advisors as being rather 
untrustworthy and being not very confident that advisors present adequate solutions to their 
needs (Mogicato et al. 2009; Nussbaumer et al. 2011). Indeed – as, for example, Bergstresser 
et al. (2009) have shown – products recommended by advisors tend to exhibit higher costs 
while featuring lower risk-adjusted return than products selected by investors themselves. 
The prevailing advisory business model of FSPs in Switzerland (and, incidentally, also in 
Germany and other European countries (Oehler and Kohlert 2009)) builds on cross-
subsidizing advisory services through product and transaction costs (by direct and indirect 
costs, as discussed above) (Roth 2007); while this strategy allows providing advisory services 
“free-of-charge”, the actual costs of advice – as included in the product costs – remain non-
transparent. Though such lack of transparency might negatively affect the client-advisor 
relationship and the client’s resulting satisfaction, FSPs are still reluctant regarding alternative 
business models. Fee-based advice, i.e., the client being charged for utilizing advisory 
services, has been discussed long-since and suggested as a solution to interest asymmetries 
(Oehler and Kohlert 2009). FSPs, however, have been countering such models by bringing 
forward that clients were accustomed to services provided free-of-charge and therefore lack 
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willingness to pay for them – for a “first-moving” FSP, charging fees could thereby result in 
competitive disadvantages (Mogicato et al. 2009). 
2.4 Cost Transparency and Information Technology 
As indicated in the introduction, cost transparency might also be inhibited by the lack of 
appropriate tools. While, e.g., costs of individual stocks may be easily evaluated according to 
up-to-date printouts of the according fact sheets, such assessments tend to get more complex 
for composite products such as mutual funds, featuring multiple cost types. When including 
the dynamic allocation of several products while accounting and optimizing for product and 
overall portfolio costs (including means of comparing different options and presenting their 
effects for the client’s specific portfolio), the use of pen and paper is clearly limited.  
While the typical Swiss FSP provides the advisor with powerful tools to prepare client 
encounters and perform follow-up activities, IT support for advisor-client encounters is hardly 
found. For Swiss advisory practice, Schwabe and Nussbaumer (2009) found that none of the 
37 surveyed FSPs provided their advisors with dedicated tools to be used directly with clients. 
The provided IT’s focus on supporting activities outside the actual client encounter is also 
reflected in standard software – most products lack of dedicated in-meeting support other than 
rotating the monitor screen to let the client behold of visualizations. Such setups of ad-hoc 
inclusion of IT may not only expatiate on the information asymmetry between the actors but 
may also increase the inexperienced client’s uncertainty as the visualizations are mostly 
intended for experts (i.e., the advisor) (Inbar and Tractinsky 2011). 
Likewise, research on IT support of financial advisory services (of which investment advisory 
services are a subset of) often shows an implicit focus on supporting the advisor in preparing 
client solutions (Buhl et al. 2007; Dziarstek et al. 2004; Eberhardt and Zimmermann 2007; 
Winkler 2006). The use of such systems may in fact restrict the advisor in respect to 
opportunism (e.g., recommending products not suitable for the client but attractive to the 
advisors in terms of provisions). However, these systems are designed to be used solely by the 
advisor outside the encounter, i.e., before or after the advisory session. As the client thereby 
cannot actually monitor the advisor’s interaction with the information systems, they do not 
directly contribute to enhanced transparency for the client, e.g., in respect of advisory 
activities, the used information and its effects. We find this advisor-centricity to be in stark 
contrast to related domains of sales-based advisory services such as travel consultancy, where 
there has been some research effort regarding in-situ IT support for joint decision-making of 
advisor and client (e.g., Halloran et al. 2002; Novak and Schwabe 2009; Rodden et al. 2003). 
3 Transparent Design of Investment Advisory Encounters 
We suggest that the problem areas of investment advisory services (low comprehensibility 
and low perceived quality because of information and interest asymmetries) may be attributed 
to inherent transparency issues regarding the activities of the advisory process (process 
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transparency), the information used therein and their impacts (information transparency) and, 
as a facet of such information, costs of the service and its products (cost transparency). In 
previous design cycles, we have already developed and refined several design requirements 
for collaborative IT support to enable process and information transparency. Thus, we will 
base our considerations of cost transparency design on the main principles of such IT support 
(Nussbaumer et al. 2012). We will briefly present these principles and their basic rationales 
below. 
The most fundamental design principle (DP) relates to information sharing between the client 
and the advisor (DP1: Provide shared information spaces for advisor and client in order to 
allow information access and monitoring of actions) and represents the bottom line of 
enabling IT-mediated client-advisor interaction. Thereby, the client and advisor should be 
provided shared “informational resources” that both can refer to and make sense of (Rodden 
et al. 2003). As such, the client should be activated to participate and take more responsibility 
in the process, e.g., by enabling her to (maybe autonomously) adapt or change suggestions or 
recommendations of the advisor. 
To enable transparency in investment advisory encounters, the provision of shared 
information spaces is necessary but not sufficient. To cooperate (and co-create) with the 
advisor, the client has to understand and comprehend the means and ends, i.e., the advisor’s 
activities and their goals (DP2: Enable client comprehension of advisory activities and their 
goals in order to provide process transparency), e.g., how their initial inputs (needs, 
preferences, financial situation) are related to the final advice (e.g., product portfolio). The 
shared artifact therefore should visualize the activities so the client may comprehend 
intermediate results as well as the final solution to her investment problem. 
In traditional pen-and-paper encounters, advisors may not have complete information (e.g., 
fact sheets of all relevant products) or the latest information at hand (e.g., product 
performances). A supportive artifact therefore should enable access to all relevant information 
with the help of integrated information sources (DP3: Support client-advisor interaction with 
adequate information in order to provide information transparency). Furthermore, to address 
the client’s comprehension of information use, visualizations of relevant information should 
be provided as to give feedback regarding their purpose and possible effects. 
Clients may find it difficult to relate abstract concepts (such as risk and return of investment 
strategies) to practical impacts regarding their financial situation. Thus, the artifact should 
allow for relating the relevant concepts to each other and allow comparing different options 
(DP4: Provide means of comparison in order to enhance comprehension of the process and 
its information). For example, the client should be enabled to compare the effects of her 
optimized investment strategy with her current situation, including the risk-return tradeoffs. 
This principle thereby adds a further dimension to providing process transparency (reflecting 
the implicit solution strategy of advisory activities, i.e., optimization by comparison) and 
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information transparency (visualizing effects of provided or adapted information by 
comparing their outcomes).  
Finally, the provided shared information spaces should not restrict clients and advisors in 
performing their favored structuring and enactment of the encounter processes, i.e., not imply 
standardized step-by-step processes but allow for adaptations of the advisory process flow 
according to the specific tasks (DP5: Allow actors to customize the advisory course).  
So far, we have been able to apply and refine these design principles in three consecutive 
design cycles, investigating designs and effects of process and information transparency 
(Nussbaumer and Matter 2011; Nussbaumer et al. 2012). We found advisory encounters 
provided with shared, transparent IT support to be superior compared to their pen-and-paper 
counterparts; IT support implementing the specified design principles thereby relates to 
significantly improved process and information transparency as perceived by the client and 
significantly increased trustworthiness and client satisfaction (Nussbaumer et al. 2012). 
4 Designing for Cost Transparency 
We have argued above that issues related to cost transparency may also be a result of a lack of 
appropriate IT support in client encounters. With the typical product horizon of a FSP, paper-
based access to relevant product-related cost information as well as the dynamic calculation 
of aggregated costs might be too complex or time-consuming, therefore implying support 
with IT artifacts. To investigate our conceptualization of cost transparency, we initiated a 
design cycle based on the design principles presented in the previous section. We thereby 
sought to design an IT artifact that follows the objective of addressing the two main 
requirements of cost transparency, i.e., (1) providing transparent cost information access and 
(2) comprehensibly represent and include such information in the advisory situation. Relating 
to the proposed effects of such transparency in the literature, such an artifact should positively 
influence the client-advisor interaction and improve the client’s perception thereof. 
While previous artifacts (Nussbaumer and Matter 2011; Nussbaumer et al. 2012) focused on 
supporting advisory activities to define (strategic) investment strategies, the usage scenario of 
our cost transparency design cycle entailed the collaborative construction of (tactical) product 
portfolios according to a previously defined investment strategy. The goal thereby was to 
allow the client and advisor to browse through available products, evaluate and compare them 
and jointly decide on which products to add to the client’s portfolio.  
Since the comprehensive inclusion of all financial products potentially available to a FSP 
client was not feasible for the purpose of prototyping, we simplified the artifact’s usage 
scenario and corresponding design to allow the composition and adaptation of product 
portfolios consisting only of mutual funds. Due to their rather uniform cost structure (initial 
charges, sell charges, stamp duties and management fees) and public availability of cost 
information, they also allowed for realistic implementation and evaluation of the artifact. In 
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the following, we will re-examine the previous design principles from the perspective of cost 
transparency. 
To establish informational common ground and joint interaction, providing shared 
information spaces for advisor and client (DP1) is a prerequisite. While general transparency 
(e.g., regarding the process and activities) does not necessarily imply a technological 
imperative, we suggest that the complexity of dynamic provision of cost information requires 
this principle to be implemented using IT support. As such, cost transparency requires 
incorporation of DP1 in a technological shape to allow provision of dynamic cost information 
as well as to make them jointly available to advisor and client. This means that the client 
should not only be informed of actual costs but also be “activated” and enabled to act on the 
provided information, i.e., to incorporate costs in compiling her product portfolio. 
DP2 requires the transparent artifact to make advisory activities and their goals 
comprehensible. Such process transparency seeks to enable the client to comprehend the 
rationales that underlie the advisor’s activities, such as choices in product selection. In respect 
of cost transparency, this principle has the extended goal of enabling the client to also 
comprehend the advisor’s rationales regarding product costs. Providing means of advisor 
monitoring through shared information spaces is a prerequisite of clients to comprehend the 
advisor’s actions also regarding their implications on costs.  
Thus, to enable the client to transparently assess the financial impacts of decisions (e.g., 
buying or selling specific products), she must be enabled to monitor the specific costs of the 
emerging solution. DP3 generally seeks to transparently provide the client with the advisor’s 
informational basis (e.g., presenting internal information of the FSP as well as client 
information) and the influence and effects of this information on the advisory process and its 
result. As such, the principle emphasizes on the implied increase of client comprehension, 
e.g., when providing information material on the mechanics of asset classes or interactively 
showing the influence of the client’s marital status on her tax burden. Thus, providing 
transparent cost information may facilitate client learning of cost structures of products in 
different asset classes. However, interactively presenting product cost effects (e.g., on total 
costs or net portfolio return) also effectively addresses one of the main problems of advisory 
services, i.e., the potential opportunism of advisors. Being provided with shared information 
spaces, the client is not only enabled to monitor the advisor’s action but also to evaluate them 
in terms of costs, thereby restricting the advisor in, e.g., opportunistically recommending 
profitable but unsuitable products. Above, we have defined the provision of cost information 
as a special facet of information transparency – including cost information, however, extends 
the goal of DP3 of information provision for increased client comprehension towards client 
empowerment to evaluate (and thereby “falsify”) the advisor’s recommendations. 
Putting an emphasis on the “falsification” of advisor actions and recommendations also 
affects DP4. In respect to process transparency and general information transparency, means 
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of comparison allow the client to better comprehend the advisor’s actions and their rationale. 
For example, comparison of the projected risk and return performance of the current 
investment strategy with the projected performance of the recommended optimization 
provides the client with a general indication of potential effects. In contrast, cost transparency 
should allow comparison of recommendations’ definite effects by providing detailed cost 
information of individual products and aggregated costs for created portfolios.  
In respect of process adaptability required by DP5, introducing cost transparency should not 
interfere with the course of the advisory encounter. Transparency of costs should be enabled 
in a way that allows the client to monitor contextual cost information at any time and 
independent from advisory activities. 
5  Prototypical Implementation 
Analogous to previous design cycles (e.g., Nussbaumer et al. 2012), we instantiated the 
design principles discussed in the previous section in a software application for the Microsoft 
Surface tabletop device, supporting the interaction scenario depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Fig. 1 Collaborative client-advisor interaction, mediated by Microsoft Surface1 tabletop 
While providing a shared application constitutes the basis of fulfilling the artifact’s first 
objective –providing access to cost information –, the particular design of how to provide 
such access in an understandable and comprehensible way, as demanded by the second 
objective, is important. In the following, we will therefore provide some details on the design 
implementation along the underlying design principles. 
We designed the basic interaction of the artifact to allow collaborative creation of a product 
portfolio according to a specific (previously defined) investment strategy. To this end, client 
                                                
1 http://www.microsoft.com/surface 
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and advisor are provided with a shared information space (DP1) that mediates their encounter 
and allows both actors to interact on common ground and monitor each other’s actions.  
The application’s basic information space (Figure 2) is divided into the advisor’s solution 
space (products; Figure 2, B) and the client’s problem space (product portfolio with cost 
information; Figure 2, C) as well as a “transition space” for evaluating and comparing specific 
products (Figure 2, A) before adding them to the client portfolio.  
 
Fig. 2 Overview of the prototype application – (A) product “cards” to compare different 
products, (B) selection of products, (C) current product portfolio 
Generally, both the client and the advisor may interact with all application spaces via touch 
interaction; as he is both the domain and the tool expert, however, it is assumed that the 
advisor is the application’s primary user and leads the client through the course of portfolio 
construction. Still, the shared information space allows the client to monitor the advisor’s 
actions and take corrective action at any time (DP1, DP2). 
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The application allows constructing individual portfolios by adding and removing products 
(mutual funds) according to different asset classes (shares, bonds and real estate; Figure 2, B). 
When selecting an asset class, the associated products are presented in the “transition space” 
as cards that may be freely arranged and oriented (Figure 2, A). The cards are used to 
compare products (DP4) based on several information dimensions (see below). Once a 
product is selected, it is listed in the client’s product portfolio (Figure 2, C) along with the 
portfolio’s total costs. Thereby, the costs of all products in the portfolio are summed up and 
categorized into one-time and recurring costs. This allows showing effects of adding and 
removing products from the portfolio, enabling the client to better comprehend and 
understand the consequences of such changes (DP3). As for the client to see relevant portfolio 
cost information and include them into her decision making, the portfolio’s cost information 
is visible at any time.  
As already indicated above, all available products of the different asset classes are displayed 
as cards (Figure 2, A) that feature several information categories. To satisfy the general 
requirement of information transparency (DP3), each product card includes a short description 
and basic information about the exchange rates and net performance (Figure 3, II) as well as 
performance graphs (Figure 3, I). This information should support the client and advisor in 
evaluating the products’ appropriateness for the client’s portfolio, e.g., in regard to risk and 
return.  
Cost information is made available on a separate card tab (Figure 3, III), displaying the cost 
structure of the product with all relevant partial and aggregated costs (initial buy charges, sell 
charges, stamp duties and management fees). Furthermore, the tab allows partial and total 
costs of a product to be calculated for a specific (adaptable) investment amount. Such 
calculation of effective product costs allows quick comparison (DP3) of products independent 
from the actual portfolio, i.e., without adding and removing products and thereby changing 
the portfolio. To evaluate their actual influence on the total portfolio costs, however, the users 
may also easily add and remove products to and from the portfolio. Thereby, the client should 
be enabled to better assess the cost factors of different financial products and their 
differences, also stimulating her to discuss potential ambiguities with her advisor or “falsify” 
his recommendations.  
Our prototype design incorporates relevant cost information as contextual information that is 
attached to the advisory encounter’s main objects of interest, i.e., the products and the 
portfolio. While the current summary of portfolio costs is visible at any time, information on 
product costs on the respective cards has to be actively selected – it thereby is in the actors’ 
discretion to investigate and discuss the information or not. As such, the integrated cost 
information does not require additional advisory activities or a particular order of activities 
(DP5).  
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Fig. 3 Information provided by product cards - (I) performance view, (II) main view: general 
information (product description, figures on exchange rate and net performance) (III) cost 
structure 
6  Experimental Evaluation 
In the previous sections, we have presented the build activities of our design cycle. We re-
examined general design principles for client-advisor interaction to also account for cost 
transparency and demonstrated the feasibility of implementing them in a software artifact. 
Regarding the evaluate activity of design science endeavors, there is agreement among 
researchers that design science artifacts have to be rigorously evaluated by appropriate 
methods (Hevner et al. 2004; March and Smith 1995; Witte 1997), such that their utility, 
quality, and efficacy can be demonstrated (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 16). Thereby, the artifact’s 
performance should be evaluated against its design goals and objectives rather than only its 
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specific (technological) features (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 78; March and Smith 1995, p. 254; 
Peffers et al. 2007, p. 56). 
Several methods have been proposed such evaluation of design artifacts, including 
observational (case or field) studies, action research, surveys, analytical analyses, functional 
or structural testing, descriptive argumentation and experimental techniques such as 
controlled experiments or simulation (Cleven et al. 2009, p. 4; Hevner et al. 2004, p. 18; 
Riege et al. 2009; Siau and Rossi 2011). To validate design artifacts against conjectures about 
the outcome the designer sought to improve, experimental techniques like controlled 
experiments are useful; these allow measuring the degree to which the design objectives have 
been achieved (Briggs and Schwabe 2011). In this context, conjectures contrast the value of 
some dependent variable (e.g., satisfaction) across treatments that instantiate differing values 
of an independent variable. In design science research, one treatment often relates to using the 
designed artifact, whereas other treatments may include previously designed technological 
artifacts or control conditions featuring no technological artifact (Briggs and Schwabe 2011, 
p. 7). 
We designed and implemented our software artifact along the design objective of enabling 
cost transparency in financial advisory encounters and according to conjectures regarding the 
positive effects of such transparency suggested by the literature. Experimental techniques 
provide appropriate means to evaluate the artifact and the associated conjectures of its 
efficacy and effects in a controlled environment. The experimental setting thereby allowed us 
to simulate advisory encounters comparably well, as we could build scenarios that mirrored 
actual encounters between clients and advisors, including realistic tasks and their duration. By 
additionally employing actual investment advisors, we could evaluate the artifact in a quasi-
natural but controllable environment. 
To be able to delimit the specific utility and efficacy of our cost-transparent instantiation from 
the general features of process and information transparency, we built our experiment upon 
two different settings (treatments). Thereby, one treatment related to using the artifact that 
instantiated cost transparency, whereas the second treatment related to an analogous software 
artifact that only instantiated the general principles of information and process transparency. 
Differences in client valuation between the settings could therefore be ascribed to the 
differences of the IT artifacts, which were only related to cost transparency features. 
6.1  Conjectures 
The presented artifact was developed along the design objective of improving cost 
transparency in client-advisor encounters. The most basic conjecture of our evaluation thereby 
relates to the artifact’s fulfillment of this objective. As the designed artifact makes available 
all relevant cost information, it may be objectively referred to as being cost-transparent. 
Along our definition of cost transparency as the “client’s perceived degree of information 
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revelation regarding costs and their allocation”, we thereby assume that the designed artifact 
will also improve the clients’ subjective perception of cost transparency, i.e., improve her 
understanding and perceived comprehensibility of cost information: 
C0: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency features will show 
improved understanding and perceived comprehensibility of product costs than clients 
advised with an IT artifact not implementing cost transparency features. 
Based on the discussion of proposed transparency effects in the literature (Section 2.2), we 
may also state some conjectures regarding the expected influence of the cost-transparent 
artifact design. Literature suggests that individuals will prefer transparent alternatives 
(Andersson and Holm 1998; Camerer and Weber 1992). Furthermore, in our exploratory 
research we found that clients often ascribe their discontent with advisory services to a lack of 
transparency (Mogicato et al. 2009); by implication, we assume that clients will prefer cost 
transparent advice over its non-transparent counterpart, and – along Eggert and Helm’s (2003) 
observation that (relationship) transparency might increase client satisfaction – find both the 
encounter as well as the advisor more satisfying. The according conjectures read as follows: 
C1.1: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency features will show 
higher satisfaction regarding the advisory encounter than clients advised with an IT artifact 
not implementing cost transparency features. 
C1.2: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency features will show 
higher satisfaction regarding the advisor than clients advised with an IT artifact not 
implementing these cost transparency features. 
FSPs are not very eager to provide cost transparent advisory services because of their implied 
effects on existing business models. Research on price transparency (Carter and Curry 2010), 
however, suggests that clients not only prefer transparent settings but may also be willing to 
pay premium prices compared to non-transparent scenarios. We therefore assume that clients 
will show higher willingness to pay for cost-transparent advisory settings: 
C2: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency features will show 
higher willingness to pay for the advisory service than clients advised with an IT artifact not 
implementing cost transparency features. 
6.2  Method 
Participants. Our evaluation involved 12 clients and 2 advisors from a medium-size Swiss 
bank. We determined the sample size by applying power analysis as suggested in the 
literature (Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989; O’Keefe 2007). We thereby calculated the sample 
size of 12 client participants using G*Power 3 (Faul et al. 2007) according to an assumed 
large effect size of dz = 0.9 (with an assumed mean difference and standard deviation of 1 and 
correlation of 0.4), an error probability (α) of .05 and a test power (1-β) of .80.  
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As getting access to FSPs’ affluent clients proved prohibitively difficult because of 
confidentiality issues, we chose to acquire the client participants by recruiting them from a 
university forum (offering 20 CHF as compensation for a test duration of approximately one 
hour). Such convenience sampling, where participants partake in studies based on self-
selection, is one of the most common sampling techniques (Lunsford and Lunsford 1995, 
Trochim 2006). As opposed to random sampling, using convenience sampling does not 
provide all members of a target population an equal chance of being selected; thus, the 
participants may per se not be assumed to fully represent the target population. This may 
result in low external validity of a study. For our evaluation purposes – based on findings and 
propositions in the literature (Andersson and Holm 1998; Eggert and Helm 2003) – we argue 
that this preference for transparency is a general feature of (ambiguity-averse) individuals 
and, thus, recruiting participants by convenience sampling should not excessively constrain 
(external) validity. 
The recruited participants (9 of them being students) were between 21 and 48 years of age, 5 
of them being female, 7 being male. All of them reported high proficiency in computer use (4 
participants categorized themselves as being professional users, 8 as advanced users); only 5 
of them indicated that they were experienced with mutual funds.  
Procedure. The test procedure consisted of two subtests. One test involved the usage of the 
prototype application presented in Section 4.2, providing all relevant cost information features 
(setting T1). The benchmark test (setting T0) involved a similar application, instantiating the 
basic design principles discussed in Section 3 and implementing the same GUI and interaction 
design as the artifact in T1, but not providing cost information features and associated 
functionalities: all cost information as shown in Figure 2 (C) and Figure 3 (III) were removed. 
For both treatments, the clients and advisors received the task of compiling product portfolios 
of mutual funds with the prototype application (see below). The client participants passed 
through both settings, each being limited to 20mins. After their trials, the client participants 
completed a quantitative questionnaire and were then asked to give feedback on their 
impressions. 
To effectively counterbalance potential biases in respect of the succession of treatments, we 
randomized the order of experimental conditions (Lazar et al. 2010, pp. 50-51). Thus, we 
randomly assigned one half of the client participants to the sequence T0T1 and the other half 
to the sequence T1T0. Thereby, they were also randomly assigned to a specific combination 
of advisor and setting (e.g., each client starting with “advisor 1 – T0” would afterwards be 
exposed to “advisor 2 – T1” and vice versa). Differences in client valuation between the 
encounters could therefore be ascribed, ceteris paribus, to the manipulation of the artifact’s 
provision of cost information features. 
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On arrival, client participants received a short introduction (10mins), including instructions 
about their task and financial profile as well as explanations about their time table. To allow 
for comparison and prevent participants from disclosing their actual financial situation, clients 
received key figures of a fictional financial background (Table 1). They were requested to 
perform their tasks according to these figures. Furthermore, they were advised that the 
sessions would “differ regarding the available information”. In the sessions, the client’s main 
task was to create a product portfolio of three mutual funds (one per asset class), matching the 
given asset allocation and achieving high returns. For each asset class, the client could choose 
between two funds that featured similar investment objectives, one being actively managed 
(and therefore more costly), and the other being passively managed. To establish realistic 
conditions, we based all information of the available products (12 in total) on existent mutual 
funds, whereas we altered their names to avoid experienced clients recognizing them. 
Tab. 1 Client Profile 
Investment sum CHF 200’000 
Investment horizon 10 years 
Investment goal Achieve returns that are as high as possible 
Risk preference Aggressive (on a 5-point scale “cautious – conservative – moderate – pro-
active – aggressive”) 
Risk ability Increased (on a 5-point scale “low – limited – normal – increased – high”) 
Asset allocation 60% shares; 25% bonds; 15% real estate 
To achieve variation in client product choice and minimize learning effects between the 
settings, we implemented the following alterations between the settings: for asset class 
“shares”, the client participants had to decide on one of three categories (Swiss market, global 
market, and emerging markets) before each session, whereas for each setting they had to 
choose a different category. For asset class “bonds” the actively managed product and for 
“real estate” the passively managed product was changed between the settings. 
The two participating financial advisors were briefed regarding the client profiles 
(information listed in Table 1) and the use of the software artifact. Their main task was to 
support (“advise”) the clients in choosing appropriate products according to their profile. The 
advisor’s goal for each session was to “satisfy” the client so she would recommend the 
encounter to others. Each advisor performed six advisory sessions in setting T0 as well as six 
in T1. For the different settings, the advisors were given the following additional tasks: 
• T0: avoid discussions about costs, try to sell actively managed products  
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• T1: ensure that cost information is comprehensible for the client (making her aware 
that costs reduce overall returns) 
Apparatus. Both treatments of our evaluation were conducted using the Microsoft Surface 
1.0 tabletop system (see also Figure 1). Thereby, each setting was supported with a dedicated 
tabletop system running the respective prototype application (providing cost information 
features / not providing cost information features).  
Design and Analysis. The experimental evaluation followed a within-subjects design with the 
prototype version (providing cost information features / not providing cost information 
features) as the main experimental factor. We opted for this experimental design as it provides 
a more effective isolation of individual differences of the participants from the main effects. 
Compared to between-subject designs they are also considered more powerful, while 
requiring smaller sample size (Lazar et al. 2010, pp. 55-51). 
The quantitative client questionnaire included measurements to test our main conjectures and 
client preferences (see below) as well demographic items (age, gender, job/education, 
advisory experience, IT skills). In addition to the quantitative questionnaire, we also asked the 
client participants to give feedback on their impressions (differences, preferences) of the two 
settings as well as their experience regarding the sessions’ IT support.  
As suggested above, providing cost information through transparent shared information 
spaces already fulfilled the artifact’s first objective of making cost information accessible. To 
investigate the artifact’s efficacy in fulfilling the second objective – providing such access in 
an understandable and comprehensible way (Conjecture 0) –, however, the artifact’s utility in 
improving the clients’ cost-related perception had to be considered. We surveyed the clients’ 
perception of cost transparency using three Likert items. Thereby, the clients were asked to 
assess the different settings’ influence on (1) their subjective understanding of the product 
structure (“I understand the cost structure of the selected products.”), (2) their awareness of 
the actual product costs (“I am aware of what the selected products cost.”) as well as (3) their 
perceived comprehensibility of the provided cost information (“I found the cost information 
comprehensible.”). 
To measure satisfaction with each advisory session (Conjecture 1.1), we used items from the 
Yield Shift Theory of Satisfaction (Briggs et al. 2008). The client’s overall satisfaction with 
the advisors of the two sessions (Conjecture 1.2) was operationalized with a single item 
(“Overall, I was satisfied with the advisor.”). All constructs were measured using as seven-
point Likert items (ranging from 1 = “I strongly disagree” to 7 = “I strongly agree”). The 
participants’ willingness to pay for each performed advisory session (Conjecture 2) was 
prompted with the following item: “How much of your investment amount of CHF 200’000 
would you be willing to pay for the received advisory service?“. 
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To investigate client preferences, the questionnaire also included conjoint measures. We 
thereby conducted a rank-ordering conjoint-analysis on how the participants would trade-off 
the following aspects: (1) costs of advisory (“advisory session is free of charge” vs. “advisory 
service costs CHF 250 per hour”); (2) advisor’s interests (“advisor adheres to his own 
interests” vs. “advisor adheres to the client’s interests); (3) transparency of product costs 
(“product costs are not communicated” vs. “product costs are communicated”). The 
participant’s valuation of these aspects was tested using a complete factorial plan (2 x 2 x 2 = 
8 different alternatives), where the participants were requested to sort the given alternatives 
according to their perceived utility (attributing “1” to the advisory alternative having the 
greatest perceived utility and “8” to the advisory alternative with the smallest perceived 
utility).  
We analyzed the collected data as follows. To test our conjectures, we compared the ratings 
of the two treatments with dependent t-tests2 (two-tailed) for normally distributed differences. 
All but two differences between the dependent scores proved to follow normal distribution 
(Shapiro-Wilk, p > .081 for all differences). For items with non-normally distributed 
differences – “willingness to pay” (Shapiro-Wilk, p < .001) and “awareness of product costs” 
(Shapiro-Wilk, p = .02) – we applied Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests.  
All p-values of the statistical tests were corrected for multiple comparisons using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). The correction also 
accounted for non-significant results. To provide an objective measure of importance, we also 
calculated effect sizes for all statistical significant findings (Cohen’s d for dependent t-tests, r 
for Wilcoxon tests). To eliminate the alternative explanation that higher ratings were related 
to one advisor generally outperforming the other, we additionally evaluated the overall 
satisfaction of the participants with the two advisors. Since the ratings for the different 
advisors were not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk), we conducted a Wilcoxon test to 
investigate the differences. The rank-ordering conjoint-analysis was performed using the 
respective feature of SPSS 19.  
6.3 Results 
We present the results of our evaluation along our conjectures regarding the clients perceived 
cost transparency, satisfaction and willingness to pay. We then provide results of the conjoint 
analysis and figures on differences in the total costs of the portfolios composed in the 
different advisory settings. The clients’ average ratings of the settings as well as the results of 
the statistical tests regarding their differences are summarized in Table 2.  
                                                
2 We thereby implicitly assume that the responses to the Likert items can be treated interval. Non-parametric 
tests lead to the same results.  
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Perceived cost transparency. In our design considerations we assumed that making available 
cost information through the shared artifact should increase cost transparency. Indeed, in the 
evaluation client participants found that the costs of their selected products were more 
understandable in the cost-transparent setting T1 compared to setting T0 which excluded all 
cost information features. Results of a two-sided dependent t-test showed this difference to be 
significant with large effect size (see Table 2). Also, the participants’ agreement of being 
aware of the selected products’ costs was significantly higher for the cost-transparent situation 
with large effect size. 
Regarding the artifact design’s efficacy in providing cost transparency in an understandable 
manner, we also measured the client’s perception of the provided information’s 
comprehensibility. Supporting our conjecture, results show that client participants found cost 
information provision very comprehensible for the cost-transparent situation, showing a 
significant difference compared to the non-transparent setting with large effect size. 
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Tab. 2 Evaluation results (M = mean agreement, SD = standard deviation) 
Measure Rating for T0  
(not cost-transparent) 
Rating for T1  
(cost-transparent) 
Test of difference  
(two-sided) 
Understanding of 
product cost structure 
M = 2.83  
SD = 1.75 
M = 6.00  
SD = 0.85 
t(11) = -5.162, p = .001 
d = 2.44 
Awareness of selected 
product costs 
M = 2.58  
SD = 1.98 
M = 6.50  
SD = 0.67 
Z = -2.865, p = .008 
r = -.58 
Comprehensibility of 
cost information 
M = 2.42  
SD = 1.83 
M = 6.00 
SD = 0.95 
t(11) = -5.555, p =  .001 
d = 2.58 
Satisfaction with 
advisory session 
M = 4.60 
SD = 1.39 
M = 5.98  
SD = 0.79 
t(11) = -3.718, p = .009 
d = 1.26 
Satisfaction with 
advisor 
M = 4.58  
SD = 1.62 
M = 6.00 
SD = 0.74 
t(11) = -3.559, p = .007 
d = 1.20 
Willingness to pay  
(without outlier) 
M = 366.36  
SD = 415.87 
M = 710.91  
SD = 714.71 
Z = -2.371, p = .020  
r = -.48 
Total portfolio costs M = 6395.25  SD = 2839.56 
M = 3577.58 
SD = 2355.79 
t(11) = 2.946, p = .017  
d = 1.08 
To gain qualitative argumentation from the participants, we also asked them for feedback on 
their experience. Observing the sessions, we found that only three of six participants passing 
the sessions in the sequence T1T0 asked about costs in T0 (featuring no cost information). In 
their feedback, however, those who had asked for cost information voiced their dissatisfaction 
with the advisors’ answers. They criticized that the advisor just “read out some numbers from 
a sheet of paper”, which was insufficient for them to make a decision. Two of the three 
participants, who did not ask about the costs in T0, said that they – after having already 
experienced T1 – felt confident of being able to estimate the costs themselves. Interestingly, 
most of the participants passing the sessions in the sequence T0T1 mentioned that they had 
not realized that the advisor of T0 had kept back cost information until they passed T1. 
Satisfaction. Both the clients’ satisfaction with the advisory session as well as with the 
advisor were rated significantly lower for T0 (non-transparent regarding costs) than for T1 
(cost-transparent) with large effect sizes. Hence, according to our data we may maintain 
conjecture C1.1 and C1.2. To eliminate the alternative explanation that higher satisfaction 
ratings might be related to one advisor generally outperforming the other, we sorted the 
participant’s satisfaction ratings by advisor (advisor 1: M = 5.75, SD = 1.14; advisor 2: M = 
4.83, SD = 1.59). A Wilcoxon test did not show any significant differences between the 
advisor ratings, i.e., one advisor did not significantly outperform the other. 
In their feedbacks, all twelve participants indicated that they would clearly recommend the 
advisory session featuring all relevant cost information (T1). The specific explanations of 
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their recommendation, however, were different. Four participants preferred T1 because they 
felt “better informed”. Two felt that T1 was “more transparent” than T0. One participant 
mentioned that, while in T0 the advisor “was beating around the bush”, session T1 better 
enabled advisor and client to “talk about facts”. Four clients based their recommendation on 
the perception that the advisor in T1 was more competent. 
Willingness to pay. While the average willingness to pay for T0 was CHF 503, the 
participants were willing to pay CHF 1’485 for T1. The large standard deviation of T1 (T0: 
SD = 616.13; T1: SD = 2’766.76) is salient, but can be explained by the large variations (the 
differences between T0 and T1 ranged from CHF 0 to CHF 8’000). If we exclude one outlier 
(difference between the two answers: CHF 8’000), the differences between T0 and T1 are 
significant with a large effect size (see Table 2). We therefore also may maintain conjecture 
C2. 
Conjoint analysis. The rank-ordering conjoint analysis (see Figure 4) shows that the 
participants value the advisor’s interest the most (49%). Valued with 27.6%, also cost 
transparency seems to be more important for the participants than the advisory service being 
free-of-charge (23.4%). 
 
Fig. 4 Importance of advisory aspects as valued by the participants 
Though the sample size of the rank-ordering conjoint-analysis is too small to allow for 
general assumptions about the value systems of FSP clients, it provides interesting insights 
about how the participants trade off the different aspects.  
For each advisory session the assembled portfolio was saved. Analyzing these portfolios, we 
find that for T0 63.9% of the chosen products were actively managed (and therefore more 
costly), whereas for T1 only 27.8% of the chosen products were actively managed (difference 
between T0 and T1: -36.1%). Only considering portfolios of clients inexperienced with 
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mutual funds, the amount of actively managed products decreases by -52% – for experienced 
clients, however, we only find a difference of -13%. Accordingly, the calculated portfolio 
costs per year (including issuing commission and redemption commission) are significantly 
higher for T0 with a large effect size (see Table 2). 
The participants’ feedback on the IT support was mainly positive, with only two participants 
stating that they disliked the tool. One of them regarded himself as “old-fashioned” and would 
have preferred a paper-based advisory service. The other criticized the low resolution of the 
tabletop device and thus also would have preferred a paper-based or PC-based advisory 
encounter. The remaining ten participants, however, showed a very positive attitude toward 
the provided IT support. One participant described the advisory encounter as being very goal-
oriented, thereby greatly simplifying the investment decision, whereas another one 
emphasized on the provided transparency and comprehensibility – enabling the client to 
observe the advisor’s actions at any time. Lastly, one participant expressed his attitude as 
follows: “Why such tools are not already used in the daily business?” 
7 Discussion 
In this paper, we have argued that issues of process, information and cost transparency may 
be adequately addressed with collaborative and transparent IT artifacts. Instantiating design 
principles that have been developed and refined in previous design cycles, we presented how 
cost transparency may be supported by example of a prototypical tabletop application. We 
then investigated the efficacy and utility of our cost-transparent design in an experimental 
evaluation. 
Looking at the results, we can see that the cost transparency features of our artifact design 
indeed improved the clients’ understanding and perceived comprehension of costs. Also, we 
found that cost transparency also influences client-advisor interaction and the client’s 
perception thereof; supporting the client-advisor encounter with a cost-transparent artifact 
thereby relates to significantly increased client satisfaction with the situation and the advisor 
as well as increased willingness to pay. Thus, we may maintain all conjectures posed in 
Section 6.1. 
Cost transparency. We defined the two main objectives of our designed artifact to (1) 
provide access to cost information and (2) to comprehensibly represent and include the 
information into the advisory situation. Based on several generic design principles, we have 
presented an artifact design that fulfills the first objective by providing shared information 
spaces, allowing clients to access cost information in the advisory encounter. Regarding the 
second objective, in our evaluation we could also show that the design also succeeded in 
providing cost information in a comprehensible way. While the large differences between the 
settings might seem quite obvious – after all, for the non-transparent setting clients rated their 
understanding and comprehensibility based on being provided no cost information at all –, 
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also the absolute ratings of the cost-transparent setting’s comprehensibility were very high 
(with mean ratings of 6.00). 
Client satisfaction. We have argued that in investment advisory services cost transparency 
issues may inhibit advisory quality and may lead to client dissatisfaction (Mogicato et al. 
2009; Oehler and Kohlert 2009). Research suggests that clients might not only prefer 
transparent situations (Camerer and Weber 1992; Carter and Curry 2010), since they are less 
“ambiguous” and therefore easier to “falsify”, but also perceive them as more satisfying 
(Eggert and Helm 2003). The results of our evaluation support such notions, showing that the 
presence of an artifact providing cost information may increase client satisfaction. Indeed, we 
find significant differences with large effect sizes in the client’s ratings of both the advisory 
session as well as the according advisor – in this regard, it is important to note that the clients’ 
satisfaction with the advisor increased with the cost-transparent setting, i.e., their satisfaction 
was not based on specific characteristics of the advisor but the presence of cost information.  
Willingness to pay. Our results clearly support the conjecture that transparency might 
increase the client’s willingness to pay for advice – the evaluation shows that the client’s 
willingness to pay significantly increased in the advisory settings using our cost-transparent 
artifact. Looking at the large effects regarding the decrease of effective portfolio costs in the 
transparent setting, the willingness to pay is justified from an economic perspective. 
However, the client’s “social perspective” on pricing (Carter and Curry 2010) might also 
influence such behavior – from this perspective, the rather high willingness to pay may result 
from the client rewarding the advisor’s transparent and “fair” advice.  
The client’s willingness to pay may be one fundamental premise for FSPs to abandon today’s 
practice of cross-subsidizing advisory services with product and transaction costs. The 
participants of our evaluation were indeed willing to pay for the received advisory services, 
even for the setting that did not feature cost transparency. We cannot, however, estimate 
possible effects of the IT artifacts on the client’s perception – with 10 of 12 participants 
positively evaluating the artifacts, we cannot rule out positive effects on their willingness to 
pay for both settings.  
From an economic perspective, the amount our participants were willing to pay clearly failed 
to draw level with the FSP’s potential gains from portfolio costs. However, as our conjoint 
analysis exemplarily shows, the clients may also be willing to pay for advice on a recurring 
basis (e.g., per hour). Indeed, compared to the advisor’s interests and cost transparency of the 
encounter, our evaluation participants valued advisory costs as rather unimportant. These 
preferences were compatible with their reported willingness to pay: clients were willing to 
pay much higher fees for the encounter that was cost-transparent and thus less asymmetric. 
Contrary to the FSPs beliefs, this may indicate that the client’s willingness to pay is not the 
main obstacle of alternative business models. Furthermore, given that active clients typically 
seek advice several times a year, fee-based but transparent advisory models could indeed be 
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economically viable (presuming that in such scenarios cross-subsidization will decrease). 
However, from our observations we cannot estimate the actual share of clients willing to pay 
for advice – further research will have to investigate whether and in how far the population of 
advisory clients conforms to our observed preference system. 
We conclude the discussion with some remarks on further potential limitations. While the 
design principles have been developed and refined in several design iterations, they are 
general in nature and provide only few implications on their actual implementation in an IT 
artifact. For example, our artifact’s “card” metaphor to allow for comparison of multiple 
products is only one of many possibilities to provide such functionality. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge that each instantiation of an artifact supporting collaborative, (cost) 
transparent client-advisor interaction may greatly differ in appearance and usability; 
furthermore, from our experimental evaluation, we may not conclude that our implementation 
was “optimal” or superior to other potential design instantiations. This also applies to the cost 
information we decided to implement and visualize – while we were eager to design the 
information architecture along standard FSPs brochures available to clients, the selection of 
relevant cost information was subject to our restriction on mutual funds. 
Other limitations are related to our evaluation design. We carefully designed our experimental 
evaluations regarding the test design and its estimated effects based on power analysis and 
controlled for the influence of advisor/setting combinations by balancing client assignment to 
the different treatments. We acknowledge, however, that the majority of client participants 
were students rather than “real” investors. We argue, however, that preference for 
transparency is a general feature of ambiguity-averse individuals (Andersson and Holm 
1998), such that our results may also be applicable to the “population” of investors. Also, we 
did not find differences between the ratings of experienced clients and their inexperienced 
counterparts. To be sure, the test setting and the sample size are not qualified to reliably 
control for such effects – we suggest that further research should investigate possible 
variances according to such client characteristics. 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed several transparency issues that occur in investment advisory 
service encounters, putting an emphasis on cost transparency. Building upon tried design 
principles, we implemented a prototypical IT artifact, exemplarily enabling cost-transparent 
composition of product portfolios. We evaluated the application’s utility and efficacy in 
experimental evaluations and according to four conjectures. Results show that the artifact’s 
transparent provision of cost information indeed increases the client’s perception 
understanding and comprehension of costs, positively influences the client’s satisfaction with 
the advisory encounter (and the advisor) as well as relates to significantly increased 
willingness to pay for the service received. Analogous to similar evaluations (Nussbaumer et 
al. 2012), feedback on the IT artifact was very positive, suggesting that IT-supported advisory 
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encounters may be accepted by advisors and clients alike. Clients showed significantly 
increased satisfaction with the advisor in the cost-transparent setting, some of them even 
perceiving him as more competent. Thus, contrary to the popular argumentation of advisors 
that using IT in client encounters would negatively influence the client-advisor interaction 
(Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009), IT might even improve the client’s perception of the 
advisor. 
We have motivated this paper from observations of Swiss investment advisory services. 
However, the design research question of cost transparency and its utility are not limited to 
the Swiss market. We argue that information and interest asymmetries are general features of 
investment advisory services – e.g., even fee-based advisory concepts (which are more 
prevalent outside of Switzerland) may be strained by principal-agent conflicts regarding cost 
information. Thus, we find that our findings may indeed have general implications for 
(investment) advisory services also outside of Switzerland. 
From our findings, we suggest several such implications for FSP practice of investment 
advisory service provision. Generally, we argue that for FSPs (cost) transparency should not 
only take a role in obeying regulations – in fact, they should actively seek realization of 
transparency as a means of competitive differentiation. In this paper, we have shown how this 
may be accomplished with IT. Not only are clients increasingly demanding IT support in 
service encounters (Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009) but also may IT be key in addressing 
transparency issues which affect client-advisor interaction and, thereby, advisory quality.  
We find that establishing IT-supported transparency may be of value for almost all existing 
business models of FSPs; for clients seeking “execution only” services, IT may be used to 
show potential effects of client decisions and ensure their suitability – even though for 
“execution only” Swiss FSPs are not obliged to perform suitability checks, IT support would 
allow for such feedback in an efficient way, thereby potentially increasing client satisfaction 
and retention. We find the greatest potential, however, in the support of “investment advice” 
encounters. Here IT may provide a common ground of client-advisor interaction and point of 
reference for their joint decisions. Thereby, IT may not only enable transparency and 
traceability as requested by regulations but also provide support for the advisor to better 
advise the client and increase comprehension of her investment decisions. 
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